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The progenitor of the U.S. residential mortgage ﬁrst emerged in medieval England, and in
the intervening 700 years, courts and legislators have established more and more protections
for borrowers who default on their loans. Even today, many want to strengthen the laws even
further. Researchers at the National Consumer Law Center argued in a recent policy paper
that “antiquated state laws ... in some ways aﬀord fewer protections to homeowners than
to renters” and thus “[s]tates can and must do more to allow families to avoid foreclosure
and preserve their homes and the wealth and savings embodied in them” (Rao and Walsh
2009, 3, 4).
In this paper, we measure the eﬀectiveness of borrower protections by evaluating two
policy interventions. The ﬁrst is the right of a borrower to a judicial review of a foreclosure.
Only 20 states, known as judicial states, provide for automatic judicial review, while the
remaining 30 states, so-called power-of-sale states, allow the lender to foreclose without any
judicial supervision. Thus it is possible to exploit variation across states to estimate the
eﬀectiveness of judicial review at preventing unnecessary foreclosures. But a problem with
using state-level variation is that there is a strong regional pattern to judicial review; most
judicial states are located in the Northeast, while power of sale predominates in the fast-
growing southern and western states. To address the potential omitted-variables problem
generated by these regional patterns, we turn to a diﬀerent intervention—a “right-to-cure”
law that blocks lenders from starting foreclosure proceedings for a set period of time after
a borrower defaults on his or her loan. We focus on the Massachusetts statute that took
eﬀect on May 1, 2008, in the midst of the worst foreclosure crisis in the state’s history. We
employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy that compares mortgage outcomes
in Massachusetts before and after the law’s implementation with outcomes in neighboring
states that did not adopt such a law. By looking at the same state before and after the im-
position of the law, we control for state eﬀects, and by comparing changes in Massachusetts
with changes in neighboring states, we control for time trends in borrower outcomes.
We measure the eﬀects of the two policies using three metrics. First we look at foreclo-
sures and ﬁnd that both judicial foreclosure and the right-to-cure law have a dramatic eﬀect
on extending the foreclosure timeline. A year after a borrower enters serious default, which
we deﬁne as becoming 90-days delinquent, lenders had auctioned oﬀ only 14 percent of prop-
erties in judicial states compared to 35 percent in power-of-sale states. The imposition of
the right-to-cure law essentially brought foreclosure ﬁlings to a halt and led to a consistent
90-day delay in ﬁlings for all subsequent foreclosures. The eﬀect of the right-to-cure statute
on completed foreclosure auctions was much less pronounced, a point to which we return
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The second metric involves looking at the likelihood of good outcomes, namely that a
borrower in default subsequently “cures” the default by becoming current on the loan or
by paying it oﬀ. We ﬁnd that judicial intervention has no eﬀect on cure rates. A year
after default, 26.0 percent of borrowers in judicial states cure their default compared to
25.6 percent in power-of-sale states. When we focus on the imposition of the right-to-cure
law in Massachusetts, we ﬁnd similar eﬀects. Over the same period, the diﬀerence in cure
rates between borrowers who were subject to the protections of the right-to-cure law in
Massachusetts mirror those of borrowers in neighboring states who did not have the same
protections.
Some may see the large reduction in bad outcomes and no diﬀerence in good outcomes
as contradictory. But there is no contradiction because of a third outcome: many borrow-
ers languish in persistent delinquency, in which they neither cure their defaults nor lose
their homes to foreclosure. In short, judicial intervention succeeds in temporarily reducing
foreclosure by increasing the incidence of persistent delinquency. We show that persistently
delinquent borrowers are unlikely to cure and that most eventually experience foreclosure.
Over time, the foreclosure gap between judicial and power-of-sale states shrinks whereas the
cure gap, or lack thereof, stays exactly the same. In other words, in the long run, a given
number of defaults is expected to yield the same number of foreclosures regardless of the
laws. These borrower-protection laws do not prevent foreclosure, they merely delay it.
The third metric for measuring the eﬀect of lengthening the foreclosure timeline involves
the likelihood of renegotiation between borrowers and lenders. One argument for increased
borrower protection is that it may facilitate renegotiation—both directly, by allowing bor-
rowers more time to make the case to their lender, and indirectly, by increasing borrowers’
bargaining power. We ﬁnd that prolonging the foreclosure process has no eﬀect on the like-
lihood that a borrower receives a mortgage modiﬁcation or, in the case of the right-to-cure
law, on the diﬀerence in modiﬁcation rates across states.
To better understand the dynamics of foreclosures and cures, we use a competing-risks
hazard framework. Overall, both the instantaneous foreclosure hazard and cure hazard are
signiﬁcantly higher in power-of-sale states. To be clear, this fact means that delinquent
borrowers in power-of-sale states are simultaneously more likely to be foreclosed on and
more likely to become current or pay oﬀ their loans in any given month than are borrowers
in judicial states.
While the institutional evidence provides a logical explanation for the higher foreclosure
hazard in power-of-sale states, it is less obvious why the cure rate should also be higher.
One possible explanation is that the longer period of living in the house without paying
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aﬀect the mix of borrowers in the pool of defaulters, which could lead to a lower incidence
of cure in judicial states. However, we show that the cure-rate gap only emerges three
to ﬁve months after 90-day delinquency, which is inconsistent with the strategic-default
explanation. Instead we argue, using a simple model, that unobserved heterogeneity across
borrowers in both the cure hazard and foreclosure hazard can explain the precise patterns
we observe. Speciﬁcally, we propose that lenders are less likely to foreclose on borrowers
who are more likely to cure, either because those borrowers are more likely to contest the
foreclosure or because lenders rationally provide more assistance to them. We show that
an increased state-wide foreclosure rate leads to more foreclosures of those borrowers least
likely to cure and improves the quality of the remaining pool of defaulters which, in turn,
raises the cure hazard. We show that the precise patterns of the foreclosure and cure hazards
ﬁt this story well.
Based on this empirical evidence, we argue that judicial intervention indiscriminately
slows down the foreclosure process. Essentially, the data suggest that in the ﬁrst six months
after becoming 90-days delinquent, foreclosures in power-of-sale states cull the borrowers
least likely to cure, whereas extremely low foreclosure rates in judicial states allow such
borrowers to continue to persist in delinquency. One logical explanation is that proﬁt-
maximizing lenders rationally provide a right-to-cure period by focusing their initial eﬀorts
on borrowers with little hope of curing. Another observationally equivalent possibility is that
borrowers with little hope of curing are less likely to ﬁght foreclosure. Either way, judicial
intervention appears to block eﬃcient foreclosure without promoting eﬃcient resolutions.
We use two diﬀerent data sets and a wide variety of speciﬁcations to check our results.
In the main regressions, we use data provided by Lender Processing Services (LPS), which
has the virtue of covering the entire U.S. mortgage market, including mortgages owned by
investors in private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS), loans in bank portfolios, and
mortgages in pools insured by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The LPS data, however, are
only reliable for loans originated after 2004 and do not include information about second
liens or any direct information about modiﬁcations or short sales. Because of these draw-
backs, we also use data provided by CoreLogic; its data are reliable before 2004, include
information about second liens, and have direct information about modiﬁcations and short
sales. However, the CoreLogic data cover only loans that were held in private-label MBS
deals.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section, we conduct a brief review
of the existing literature on the eﬀect of state laws on foreclosure patterns. In Section 2,
we describe the data. In Section 3, we ﬁrst discuss the nature and evolution of foreclosure
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and measure diﬀerent outcomes in judicial and power-of-sale foreclosure states. Section 4
follows with a detailed discussion and analysis of the Massachusetts right-to-cure law.
Finally, in Section 5, we address the policy implications of our ﬁndings. We argue that
both judicial intervention and the right-to-cure law fail at their stated goal of preventing
unnecessary foreclosures. We then discuss other potential costs and beneﬁts of the laws,
including reducing the ﬂow of bank-owned properties onto the market and increasing the
number of persistently delinquent properties.
1.1 Previous Literature
A number of studies have examined the factors that lead borrowers to cure mortgage de-
faults rather than lose their properties to foreclosure. This literature generally agrees that
borrowers are more likely to lose their properties to foreclosure (rather than cure or prepay)
if they have spent more time in delinquency, have higher mortgage balances or lower levels
of equity, or if their loans are less seasoned. However, the evidence is mixed on whether and
how mortgage outcomes diﬀer in judicial states compared to power-of-sale states.
In a study of 2,612 residential mortgages across the United States that were in de-
fault between 1987 and 1991, Phillips and Rosenblatt (1997) ﬁnd that mortgages in judi-
cial states were more likely to be resolved through foreclosure than those in power-of-sale
states, whereas mortgages in power-of-sale states were more likely to be resolved through
bankruptcy or a pre-foreclosure, lender–borrower negotiated sale than those in judicial
states.1 Unfortunately, the authors oﬀer no explicit information on the rate at which bor-
rowers cure their mortgage defaults. Phillips and VanderHoﬀ (2004) oﬀer some evidence on
the relationship between cure rates and state-level foreclosure laws, examining 1,907 ﬁxed-
rate mortgages in default between 1988 and 1994. They ﬁnd that cure and prepayment
rates are higher in judicial as compared to power-of-sale states, though their results lack
statistical signiﬁcance.
In contrast to Phillips and Rosenblatt, Phillips and VanderHoﬀ ﬁnd evidence that the
incidence of foreclosure is lower in judicial compared to power-of-sale states, though their
results also lack statistical signiﬁcance. Phillips and VanderHoﬀ (2004, 586) argue that ju-
dicial foreclosure slows the foreclosure timeline and raises the costs faced by lenders, which
amounts to a wealth transfer from lenders to borrowers and imposes dead-weight loss on
society. On the other hand, Phillips and Rosenblatt, who ﬁnd that loans in judicial states
1Because all of the borrowers in the sample had zero or negative equity, the authors assume that the
pre-foreclosure sales must have required lender approval. Today we would call such transactions “short
sales.”
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power-of-sale states face more imminent threats of foreclosure and these borrowers demon-
strate higher propensities to ﬁle for bankruptcy. They argue that bankruptcy, an outcome
not examined by Phillips and VanderHoﬀ (2004), should not be considered an eﬃcient form
of delinquency resolution.
More recent studies have focused on the current mortgage crisis. Pennington-Cross
(2010) ﬁnds that among 5,000 non-prime mortgages in default, judicial foreclosure pro-
ceedings are associated with both lower cure and foreclosure rates; his results are highly
signiﬁcant and seem to suggest that the slower foreclosure proceedings in judicial states
work to discourage borrowers from exiting default, either through good outcomes (paying
oﬀ or becoming current on the mortgage) or bad outcomes (losing the property through
foreclosure). Collins, Lam, and Herbert (2011) also study a sample of delinquent mortgages
in the current crisis. In their sample of 8,000 mortgages held by a large national lender,
they ﬁnd no clear relationship between judicial foreclosure requirements and cure or fore-
closure rates. However, they do ﬁnd marginally signiﬁcant evidence that loans in judicial
foreclosure states have a higher probability of being modiﬁed when compared to similar
loans that are in the same metropolitan statistical area but are located across the border
in a power-of-sale state. The authors explain that modiﬁcations may be more common in
judicial states, perhaps because the longer timeline allows borrowers greater opportunities
to work with lenders or perhaps because it provides lenders with more incentive to modify
loans, since the longer foreclosure process is more costly. However, the true mechanism
underlying their results is unclear.
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that lenders should be eager to modify loans.2 Due to
high foreclosure transaction costs and falling house prices, a lender repossessing a property
through foreclosure typically loses half the value of a loan (Cordell and Shenoy 2011).
Some estimates indicate that by modifying rather than foreclosing on loans, investors could
save $180 billion, which accounts to more than 1 percent of U.S. gross domestic product
(Foote et al. 2010). Yet mortgage modiﬁcations are rare; Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen
(2009) ﬁnd that in a sample of seriously delinquent loans, fewer than 3 percent of borrowers
2In general, modiﬁcations ﬁt into two categories: concessionary and non-concessionary agreements by
lenders. When a lender grants a concessionary modiﬁcation, it agrees to lower monthly payments, either
by reducing interest rates, extending the term (time to maturation) of the mortgage, writing down some of
the remaining principal balance of a mortgage, or some combination of these changes. These agreements
can impose signiﬁcant costs on lenders, both in the form of high monitoring costs as well as losses due to
the decreased interest payments resulting from the modiﬁed contract terms. In contrast, non-concessionary
modiﬁcations typically involve increasing the principal balance and result in higher payments from the
capitalization of arrears into the mortgage balance. Non-concessionary modiﬁcations, which were used
extensively before the foreclosure crisis, are traditionally more popular with lenders because they are cheaper
than concessionary modiﬁcations (Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009).
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Even a successful modiﬁcation involves a long negotiation process between borrowers and
lenders; lenders and servicers require extensive documentation from borrowers, which can
take months to collect.
Finally, Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2011) argue that the diﬀerences in foreclosure laws
studied in this paper provide an instrument for the number of foreclosures in a state. They
use this instrument to suggest that increased numbers of foreclosures reduce house prices
and economic activity. Our results show that their ﬁndings should be interpreted with
great caution because the eﬀect of the law is to delay, but not prevent, foreclosure. Without
profound myopia on the part of home buyers, it is not obvious why spreading foreclosures
over three years would lead to substantially less downward pressure on house prices than
spreading foreclosures over two years.
Overall, most of the previous literature that has studied the eﬀect of judicial laws on
borrower outcomes has used very small samples that are not especially representative.3 As a
result, it is diﬃcult to determine whether the results of those studies can be extrapolated to
the entire mortgage market. Additionally, those studies all utilize cross-sectional variation
in judicial laws. In contrast, our present analysis uses nationally representative data from
both the recent crisis period as well as the pre-crisis period; it also makes use of both
cross-sectional and time-series variation to estimate the impact of judicial laws on borrower
outcomes. Finally, our analysis of the right-to-cure law in Massachusetts allows us to make
causal inferences about the impact of longer foreclosure timelines on borrower outcomes.
2 Data
Two main sources of data are used in our analysis. The primary data set comes from LPS
and contains loan-level data that cover approximately 60 percent of residential mortgages
nationwide, including those serviced by nine of the top ten mortgage servicers.4 The LPS
data include detailed information on the characteristics and performance of both purchase-
money mortgages and mortgages used to reﬁnance existing debt.5 The LPS data set is
representative of the entire U.S. mortgage market because it contains loans that are held
on the balance sheets of banks, loans securitized by the government-sponsored enterprises
3For example, Pennington-Cross (2010) only uses data for a single segment of the mortgage market and
Collins, Lam, and Herbert (2011) only use data from a single mortgage lender.
4LPS is a servicer-based data set. Servicers that contribute to the data report the attributes and
performance history of the mortgages in their respective portfolios.
5We use a 10-percent random sample of the LPS data when estimating all of our empirical models. The
data set is simply too large to use in its entirety from a computational standpoint. However, the main
results in the paper are robust to increasing the sample size.
6(GSEs), loans securitized by private institutions (private-label loans), as well as loans orig-
inated by federal government agencies such as the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and
the Department of Veterans Aﬀairs (VA). The LPS sample used in the analysis is lim-
ited to ﬁrst-lien mortgages that were originated between 2005 and 2007.6 We follow these
mortgages through April 2011.
The LPS data set contains detailed monthly information on the status of borrowers’ re-
payment behavior. It is possible to tell whether a borrower is current on his or her mortgage
or misses a payment and whether a borrower is one payment behind (30-days delinquent),
two payments behind (60-days delinquent), or three or more payments behind (90-days
delinquent). It is also possible to tell when the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings as
well as when the foreclosure process ends and the lender repossesses the property. Unfor-
tunately, there is no indicator for whether the lender grants a delinquent borrower a loan
modiﬁcation, but it is still possible to identify modiﬁcations in the LPS sample using an
algorithm that we developed in previous work. Basically, the algorithm identiﬁes instances
of modiﬁcation by using changes in the terms of the contracts.7
In addition to the LPS data, we use loan-level data from CoreLogic on privately secu-
ritized mortgages, which include information on subprime, alt-a, and jumbo prime loans.8
Though very similar in content to the LPS data, the CoreLogic data are not representa-
tive of the entire U.S. mortgage market because they do not contain loans securitized by
the GSEs or loans retained on mortgage originators’ balance sheets. Despite this signiﬁ-
cant drawback, the CoreLogic data do provide a couple of advantages over the LPS data set.
First, the time-series coverage is slightly better—CoreLogic has information on private-label
mortgages going back to the 1990s. In addition, there is an explicit ﬂag in the data set that
indicates when a mortgage has been modiﬁed. This information is reported directly by the
servicer and provides a nice check on the robustness of the results on modiﬁcations obtained
indirectly from the LPS sample.
Our analysis focuses on three samples of data. The primary sample is derived from the
LPS data set and includes mortgages originated between 2005 and 2007 that became 90-
days delinquent (at least three missed monthly payments) before March 1, 2009. Outcomes
for these mortgages are followed through August 2010, which allows us to observe each loan
in the sample for at least 18 months after it became seriously delinquent.9 The second
6LPS added a few large national servicers in January 2005, which created an attrition bias for the
mortgage data prior to 2005. When a servicer enters the LPS data set it only provides information on
active loans. Thus, if one uses data prior to 2005 from these servicers, it will include only the mortgages
that survived until 2005.
7For a more detailed explanation see Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009).
8Jumbo prime refer to prime mortgages that are larger than the GSE conforming-loan limits.
9For the majority of our analysis, we follow loans through only August 2010 in order to avoid contami-
7sample is derived from the CoreLogic data set but is otherwise identical to the LPS sample
(mortgages originated between 2005 and 2007 that became seriously delinquent before March
1, 2009). This sample, which slightly overlaps with the LPS sample, is used as a check on
the representativeness of the results from the LPS sample and a check on the accuracy of
the algorithm used to identify modiﬁcations in the LPS sample.10 Finally, the third sample
consists of loans in the CoreLogic data that were originated between 2000 and 2002. These
loans are followed and their outcomes observed through 2005. This sample of loans allows us
to focus on a period before the current mortgage and foreclosure crisis and to test whether
the judicial foreclosure process produced more successful borrower outcomes in “normal
times” when defaults and foreclosures were much less widespread.
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the three data samples. The 2005–2010 LPS and
CoreLogic samples are broadly similar. The biggest diﬀerence between the two samples is
the fraction of ﬁxed-rate versus adjustable-rate mortgages. Since adjustable-rate mortgages
were the most common type of loan in the subprime and alt-a segments of the market,
they make up the vast majority of the CoreLogic data. Data from CoreLogic on loans
originated between 2000 and 2002 that became seriously delinquent by 2004 help illustrate
the diﬀerences in judicial and power-of-sale states before the current mortgage crisis. Loans
in this period were more commonly reﬁnance mortgages, secured by single-family, owner-
occupied properties. Borrowers tended to have lower FICO scores and defaulted earlier in
the life of the loan, but house prices in their neighborhoods were increasing rapidly since
the time of origination (an average of 11 percent), and the borrowers were more successful
at curing their delinquencies quickly.
The analysis considers two diﬀerent measures of successful resolutions to serious delin-
quency: cure and modiﬁcation. A cure is deﬁned to be an instance in which a borrower in
serious delinquency becomes current on the mortgage again and remains in the house or an
instance in which the borrower is somehow able to pay oﬀ the remaining mortgage balance
by selling the property or reﬁnancing the mortgage.11 Unfortunately, the LPS data lack
suﬃcient information to distinguish between genuine payoﬀs of the entire mortgage balance
and short sales, transactions in which the lender allows the borrower to sell the property
for less than the outstanding balance. Fortunately, the CoreLogic data contain information
suﬃcient to distinguish these two types of sales. CoreLogic reports the loss that investors
who own the mortgages experience when the mortgages terminate. In some speciﬁcations
nation of our sample from the national “robo-signing” problem and subsequent foreclosure slow-downs and
moratoria that impacted judicial states more severely than power-of-sale states.
10We were told in conversations with LPS employees that LPS has the weakest coverage for the private-
label market, which is the only part of the U.S. mortgage market represented in the CoreLogic data.
11It is not possible to distinguish between a payoﬀ resulting from a reﬁnance or a sale in the LPS and
CoreLogic samples. It is only possible to determine when a borrower paid oﬀ his or her current mortgage.
8we show results for short sales as an alternative outcome for delinquent mortgages.12
The CoreLogic data also serve as a robustness check for the results on mortgage modiﬁ-
cations. A modiﬁcation in the LPS data set is deﬁned to be an instance in which one of the
characteristics of the mortgage changes in a manner not stipulated by the original terms
of the contract, while a modiﬁcation in the CoreLogic data set is an instance in which the
servicer reports that the mortgage has been modiﬁed and explicitly notes the changes in
the mortgage terms. The main empirical analysis compares cumulative cure, foreclosure,
and modiﬁcation rates in judicial versus power-of-sale states over 3-, 6-, 12-, and 18-month
horizons following the default. A delinquent borrower is considered to have cured if he or she
becomes current on the mortgage or pays oﬀ the loan at any point within the given horizon.
Thus, even if a borrower becomes current brieﬂy but reverts back to serious delinquency
at the end of the horizon, he or she is considered to have cured the delinquency. We also
compare cure and modiﬁcation hazard rates across states with diﬀerent foreclosure processes
to see if delinquent borrowers in judicial states are more likely to cure or renegotiate at any
given point in time.
In our full models, we include controls for the change in the borrower’s ZIP code–level
house price index from origination to the month in which the borrower became seriously
delinquent. We also include the change in the county-level unemployment rate during this
time, as well as the borrower and loan characteristics displayed in Table 1.
3 Judicial Intervention
The original common-law mortgage, the progenitor of almost all mortgages in Anglo-Saxon
countries, was a repurchase agreement in which the borrower sold the property to the lender
and promised to buy it back by repaying the loan plus interest on an agreed date known as
law day. If the borrower failed to appear on law day, the repurchase agreement was void and
the lender received clean title to the property, unencumbered by the borrower’s repurchase
right. English courts of equity viewed this contract as unfair because if the value of the
property exceeded the balance on the loan, default would lead to a transfer of wealth from
borrower to lender. To remedy this, courts in 16th century England gave the borrower the
right to repurchase or redeem the property even if he or she had defaulted on the loan. The
borrower could exercise this repurchase right by paying oﬀ the loan including interest and
any associated costs. The courts understood that there needed to be some limit on the
12We tested several methods for identifying short sales using the loss information. In this paper a
mortgage is considered to have ended in short sale if it is marked as “paid oﬀ” in CoreLogic but the
mortgage investors experienced a loss greater than 10 percent of the original mortgage principal.
9“right of equitable redemption,” as it became known, because otherwise the lender could
never obtain clean title and therefore the property could never function as collateral for
the loan. To solve this issue the courts allowed lenders to petition them to foreclose the
borrower’s right of equitable redemption—this basic legal concept is the principle behind
foreclosure to this day.
The methods of foreclosure have changed, however. Before the 19th century, foreclosure
auctions were uncommon. Foreclosures were what are now called “strict,” meaning that
the lender took possession of the property and it was disposed of at the lender’s discretion.
However, the courts thought that this was unsatisfactory for largely the same reason the
English courts of equity thought that the original medieval mortgage was lacking—the value
of the property could still exceed the amount owed and in that case “there is injustice to the
mortgagor” (Osborne 1951, 904). The solution to this issue became known in the United
States as “foreclosure by sale,” whereby a foreclosure is eﬀected by a public auction of the
property and the borrower recovers any proceeds in excess of the amount owed to the lender
(Osborne 1951, 908). Essentially, the auction provides price discovery.
Two types of foreclosure by sale emerged in U.S. law, and the diﬀerence between them
is the focus of this section’s policy analysis. The ﬁrst type is foreclosure by judicial sale, in
which the lender petitions the court and the court executes the foreclosure by auctioning
the property. The alternative approach is that the borrower agrees at origination to give
the lender the right to carry out a foreclosure auction in the event of default, a right known
as “power of sale” (Osborne 1951, 992). Rare in the early 19th century, power-of-sale
foreclosure became more common in the United States over time (Osborne 1951, 993).
The key to the present analysis is that the use of power-of-sale foreclosure varies by
state. In some states, such as Massachusetts, it is used almost exclusively, while in other
states, such as Connecticut, the law recognizes only judicial foreclosure. However, catego-
rizing states as either “judicial” or “power-of-sale” is not trivial. For starters, the judicial
foreclosure option is available in all states, and in some cases lenders might choose to obtain
a judgment even when the mortgage deed gives them power of sale. For example, in Califor-
nia a lender which executes a power-of-sale foreclosure loses the right to collect any shortfall
between the amount owed by the borrower and the proceeds from the foreclosure auction.
More generally, judicial foreclosures are thought to produce clean titles more consistently
because defects are less likely. As Nelson and Whitman (1985, 533) explain:
There are at least three reasons for this. First, because judicial foreclosure is
under court supervision, that very fact will prevent many of the ...defects from
arising. ... Second, because judicial foreclosure is an adversary proceeding, the
other parties aid the court in calling its attention to potential defects, a second
10type of check on the [lender] not found in power of sale foreclosure. Finally,
even if defects go uncorrected, the normal concepts of judicial ﬁnality provide
the ultimate insulation from attack for a judicial foreclosure decree.
For example, in U.S. Bank v. Iba˜ nez, a recent high-proﬁle Massachusetts lawsuit related to
the validity of a foreclosure, the lender sued for a default judgment to remove any possible
cloud from the title, despite having already carried out a power-of-sale foreclosure.13
To confuse matters even more, granting power of sale does not prevent the borrower
from attempting to block the foreclosure in the courts “because a mortgagor has the right,
based on either common law or statute, to bring suit to enjoin the foreclosure sale.”14 Rao
and Walsh (2009, 11) argue, however, that such protection is minimal:
The homeowner will need to satisfy the demanding pleading and proof require-
ments which courts impose before issuing injunctions, making it virtually im-
possible to obtain this relief without the assistance of an attorney.
At the same time, the protections aﬀorded by the judicial procedure are limited. The
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) considers judicial states to be those in which “the
lender must ﬁle an action in court ...to obtain a judicial decree authorizing a foreclosure
sale” and that “[g]enerally ...the lender must prove that there is a valid mortgage between
the parties, that the borrower is in default of the mortgage, and that the proper procedure
has been followed” (National Consumer Law Center 2010, 104). If the borrower wants to
argue, for example, that the loan was predatory, there is limited scope to do so in a standard
judicial proceeding.
Many researchers have previously attempted to categorize states as judicial or power-of-
sale but, consistent with our claim that the distinction is ambiguous at the state level, no two
of these lists are exactly the same. Some are clearly erroneous, including many of the lists
available online, such as RealtyTrac and Foreclosures.com, which include many obvious and
blatant errors.15 However, it is accurate to say that for most states the foreclosure process
is almost always either power-of-sale or judicial, and most categorizations largely coincide.
The assignment used in this paper comes from Rao and Walsh (2009), two researchers at
the NCLC. In addition, we use the list in a standard legal treatise by Nelson and Whitman
(2007), which has some minor diﬀerences with the NCLC list.16
13The case is U.S. Bank National Association, trustee, vs. Antonio Iba˜ nez (and a consolidated case), 458
Mass. 637 (2011).
14Nelson and Whitman (1985, 569), footnote omitted.
15RealtyTrac, for example, lists Massachusetts as having “deeds of trust,” a form of security interest that
does not exist in the state.
16The diﬀerence in the list is that Rao and Walsh (2009) classify Arkansas, Missouri, Nebraska and New
11The conventional wisdom is that judicial review slows down the foreclosure process—
and the data conﬁrm this fact. However, estimating foreclosure timelines directly is diﬃcult
because of severe right-censoring problems. Cordell and Shenoy (2011), for example, show
that the average foreclosure in New York occurred 20 months after it was initiated; but the
vast majority of foreclosures in Cordell and Shenoy’s sample period are incomplete (that
is, are right-censored), meaning that the expected time to foreclosure is far longer than
20 months.17 To deal with the censoring problem, we measure the monthly hazards of
foreclosure for borrowers who never cure and use those hazards to calculate the cumulative
likelihood of foreclosure. Table 2 reports two statistics: the foreclosure half-life, which
is the number of months until 50 percent of foreclosures are complete, and the percent
of foreclosures completed within 36 months. Both statistics are calculated from the time
of the ﬁrst 90-day delinquency. The results show wide variation in foreclosure timelines.
At one extreme are states such as Alaska and Michigan, in which lenders complete half
of all foreclosures within nine months. At the other end of the spectrum is New York,
in which almost three-quarters of foreclosures are still pending after 36 months. Table 2
illustrates that judicial review severely retards the foreclosure process. Foreclosure half-lives
exceed 36 months in 15 of the 18 judicial states (83 percent), but do so in only 7 of the
33 power-of-sale states (21 percent). There is wide variation within regimes, however, with
some short judicial timelines (such as Kansas) and some exceptionally long power-of-sale
timelines (including the District of Columbia and New Mexico).
In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, Rao and Walsh (2009) and others have argued for the
wholesale elimination of power-of-sale foreclosure, and several states legislatures, including
those of Massachusetts and Virginia, have considered bills to require judicial foreclosure.
Rao and Walsh (2009, 11) make their case partly on constitutional grounds, saying that
“[a] fundamental due process protection is the ‘opportunity to present objections’ to an
impartial decision-maker before an individual’s property can be taken away.” Indeed, jurists
have debated the constitutionality of power-of-sale (see Nelson and Whitman 1985, section
7.25). But Rao and Walsh (2009, 11) also make a more practical case for judicial foreclosure,
Mexico as power-of-sale and Nelson and Whitman (2007) do not. The empirical results are not sensitive to
this distinction.
17Cordell and Shenoy (2011, 8) examine the involuntary termination of over three million mortgages in
the LPS data set, dating back to 1998; they ﬁnd that the foreclosure process takes an average of 532 days in
judicial states, compared to 369 days in power-of-sale states. This time period is measured from the initiation
of foreclosure proceedings to the date the lender takes ownership or sells the property directly to a new
buyer. The delay results in greater foregone interest for mortgage holders in judicial states, which Cordell
and Shenoy (2011, 14) estimate would be an additional 2.85 percent of the principal balance. However,
because the authors investigate only loans that actually terminate, they do not address whether longer
foreclosure timelines enable delinquent borrowers to achieve better outcomes, such as curing delinquencies
or obtaining mortgage modiﬁcations.
12citing an example of a borrower and lender clearly victimized by an incompetent and corrupt
mortgage servicer.
Essentially, the question of the value of judicial foreclosure is, like many public policy
questions, a tradeoﬀ between two errors: failing to assist someone who would gain from
intervention and providing costly help to someone who would not. In this case, the former
problem is foregoing a judicial proceeding for a borrower who would be helped and the latter
is intervening on behalf of a borrower who has no hope of curing his or her default. Clearly
the NCLC researchers believe that failing to assist is the main, or perhaps only, concern, but
their anecdotal evidence does not provide any sense of the relative size of the two problems.
Our empirical analysis provides a more rigorous test of this issue and addresses the tradeoﬀ
that many, including the NCLC researchers, have failed to consider.
3.1 Measuring the Eﬀects of Judicial Foreclosure
To measure the eﬀect of judicial versus power-of-sale, four diﬀerent outcomes are considered
for a borrower who is seriously delinquent on his or her mortgage: cure, modiﬁcation,
foreclosure, and persistent delinquency. A cured mortgage is deﬁned as a case in which the
lender identiﬁes a loan as current at some point after the serious delinquency, or a case in
which a seriously delinquent borrower repays the loan in full. A modiﬁcation is identiﬁed
as a loan for which the lender changes one or more of the original contract terms to allow
the borrower to repay more easily. A foreclosure is self-explanatory, while a persistently
delinquent loan is deﬁned as a seriously delinquent mortgage for which the borrower has
not cured and the lender has not initiated foreclosure proceedings.
The deﬁnitions appear simple, but complexity emerges along several dimensions. First,
modiﬁcations and cures are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, a modiﬁcation is basically
a type of cure. In addition to changing the terms of the loan going forward by, for example,
reducing payments or principal owed, a modiﬁcation almost always involves some adjustment
to cover the arrears and fees accrued during the delinquency spell. Typically the lender will
add any missed payments to the loan’s principal balance and thus, from an accounting
standpoint, the borrower has made all payments due on the loan to date.18 While it is true
that almost all modiﬁcations lead to initial (though not necessarily permanent) cures, it is
not true that almost all cures stem from modiﬁcations. As Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen
(2009) show, many cures occur immediately after a borrower becomes seriously delinquent
and thus are very unlikely to involve assistance from the lender.
18In other words, one can view the addition to the balance as an additional loan to the borrower, which
the borrower uses to pay oﬀ the arrears.
13At any point in time after the start of a delinquency spell, the outcomes of cure, foreclo-
sure, and persistent delinquency are mutually exclusive. However, over time, the relationship
between the three outcomes becomes more complex. It is possible, but extremely rare, for a
property that has completed the foreclosure process to cure or to return to a state of persis-
tent delinquency. As a result, the terminal state of foreclosure is deﬁned as a case in which
a lender reports a property as real estate owned (REO), meaning that it is owned by the
bank, or reports that a property is “liquidated,” meaning that the lender has sold the prop-
erty (either out of REO or at the foreclosure auction). Cured loans, at the other extreme,
often transition back to persistent delinquency and to foreclosure. However, in our analysis
cure is treated as an absorbing state—once a loan cures, it is viewed as having cured for
all future observations. The logic in making this assumption is that any subsequent default
after the cure likely stems from some subsequent event. To the extent that the purpose of
policy is to facilitate cure rather than prevent subsequent distress, these subsequent events
confound the measurement of policy eﬀectiveness. Persistently delinquent borrowers almost
always transition into cure or foreclosure but, as the name suggests, a delinquent state can
persist for enormous periods of time. For example, the LPS sample includes borrowers who
have been delinquent for 72 continuous months and counting. It also includes delinquency
spells that cured after 65 months or terminated in foreclosure after 69 months. There are
11,000 loans in the 10-percent random sample with delinquency spells exceeding 36 months,
some 1,700 with spells longer than 48 months, and 170 with spells over 60 months. Not
surprisingly, most of these exceptionally long delinquencies occur in judicial states.
How do outcomes for seriously delinquent loans diﬀer across power-of-sale and judicial
states? According to the proponents of judicial foreclosure, we would expect a judicial
process to be associated with lower foreclosure rates and higher modiﬁcation and cure rates.
However, the data support only the ﬁrst of those claims. Table 3 reports the cumulative
incidence of our diﬀerent outcomes at various horizons after the start of a serious delinquency
spell.19 The table shows that at every horizon foreclosure rates are higher for borrowers in
power-of-sale states, where more than 19 out of 100 borrowers have already lost their homes
six months after becoming seriously delinquent, as compared to fewer than 3 out of 100
in judicial states. After six months, the gap shrinks in relative terms as lenders ramp up
foreclosures in judicial states, but in absolute terms, it is still the case that in judicial states
almost 20 fewer borrowers per 100 have lost their homes 18 months after the beginning of
a delinquency spell.
While judicial foreclosure successfully reduces the likelihood of foreclosure, that diﬀer-
19A delinquency spell begins the ﬁrst time the borrower becomes 90-days delinquent. Including subse-
quent delinquencies in the analysis does not alter our ﬁndings.
14ence is not oﬀset by an increase in cures but rather by an increase in the ranks of persistently
delinquent borrowers. As Table 3 shows, there is little diﬀerence between the fraction of
borrowers who cure in power-of-sale states compared to judicial states. In fact, when we
control for diﬀerences in observable loan and borrower characteristics (in a manner described
below), after 18 months the cure rate is actually signiﬁcantly higher (by over 3 percentage
points) in power-of-sale states. This ﬁnding of similar cure rates results from lower foreclo-
sure rates in judicial states leading to more persistent delinquencies. According to Table 3,
almost half of the borrowers in judicial states still own their homes 18 months after becom-
ing delinquent, having made no payments over the entire period, as compared to a little
over one quarter in power-of-sale states.
Finally, Table 3 shows that the legal regime has little eﬀect on the likelihood that a
borrower receives a loan modiﬁcation. To the extent that there are diﬀerences, modiﬁcation
rates are higher in power-of-sale states. After six months, 8.8 percent of borrowers in ju-
dicial states have received modiﬁcations, compared to 10.3 percent in power-of-sale states.
This small diﬀerence persists over time, as modiﬁcation rates are approximately 2 percent-
age points higher in power-of-sale states 18 months after serious delinquency. While the
statistics in Table 3 are derived from the 2005–2010 LPS sample, in which modiﬁcations are
imputed, the patterns are very similar using the 2005–2010 CoreLogic sample, in which the
data provider speciﬁcally ﬂags loan modiﬁcations. Unfortunately, modiﬁcation data are not
available for the CoreLogic sample containing borrowers who became seriously delinquent
in 2000–2004.
Diﬀerences between the cumulative incidences of loan outcomes between power-of-sale
and judicial states are systematically analyzed by estimating logit regressions over the hori-
zons listed in Table 3. As shown in Table 1, seriously delinquent mortgages in judicial states
are somewhat diﬀerent, on average, than loans in power-of-sale states. Namely, borrowers
in judicial states tend to have somewhat lower average FICO scores at origination (648 as
compared to 654 in power-of-sale states, according to LPS), their loans are less likely to
be secured by single-family homes (78 percent as compared to 87 percent), and area house
prices fell less in their communities since their loans were originated (9 percent as com-
pared to 13 percent). While these statistics diﬀer somewhat for the CoreLogic samples, the
relationships are broadly similar. These and other diﬀerences in mortgage characteristics—
such as whether the mortgage is a reﬁnance of a previous loan, whether the borrower is an
occupant-owner, and whether the mortgage has a ﬁxed or adjustable rate—may impact a
delinquent borrower’s ability to cure or negotiate a mortgage modiﬁcation. In the regres-
sions, we control for such characteristics to account for these inﬂuences.20 Table 4 displays
20Unfortunately, not all mortgages have a full set of covariates in the data sets. The implications of these
15the logit estimation results in the form of odds-ratios for the 2005–2010 LPS sample for
the 12-month horizon. In Table 3, we use the logit estimates to calculate the cumulative
eﬀect of judicial foreclosure proceedings on borrower outcomes at horizons of 3, 6, 12, and
18 months after borrowers become seriously delinquent.21 Within each panel of Table 3 the
columns marked “With Controls” show the diﬀerence in the cumulative incidence of cure
estimated with the logit model for a set of prototypical borrowers of ﬁxed-rate mortgages,
secured by owner-occupied single-family properties, with mean FICO scores, LTV ratios,
area house price change, and time elapsed between origination and delinquency.
The logit estimation results in Table 4 consistently show little evidence that judicial
foreclosure statutes result in better borrower outcomes. The odds ratios associated with the
judicial indicator in Table 4 are signiﬁcant at the 0.1 percent level, but are less than 1.0 in
magnitude for each outcome, indicating that borrowers in judicial states are less likely to
cure their mortgage delinquencies and negotiate modiﬁcations than borrowers in power-of-
sale states, controlling for borrower and loan characteristics. Twelve months after borrowers
become seriously delinquent, those in judicial states are about 0.86 times as likely to have
cured than are those in power-of-sale states. The diﬀerence in cumulative modiﬁcation
rates, as shown in Table 4, is similar. Again, borrowers in judicial states appear to fare
worse—borrowers in judicial states are slightly less than 0.85 times as likely to have received
a mortgage modiﬁcation over each time horizon. As with cure rates, while this diﬀerence
between borrowers in judicial and power-of-sale states is not large it is statistically signiﬁcant
and seems relatively stable across the various time horizons. Cumulative foreclosures are
much lower 12 months after default for borrowers in judicial states. In fact, such borrowers
are only 0.28 times as likely as borrowers in power-of-sale states to have lost their properties
to foreclosure. However, as we demonstrate below, foreclosure rates in judicial states catch
up with power-of-sale states over time. Ultimately, there is no net diﬀerence between the two
types of states; borrowers in judicial states simply experience longer foreclosure timelines,
not lower incidences of foreclosure.22
It is important to note that two features of the data complicate the analysis. First, about
half of the loans in the sample lack information on at least one of the covariates included
in the logit regressions. Because these loans and the associated borrowers may be diﬀerent
in some way from those with full information, the sensitivity of the results to the omission
of these loans is examined. To do this, the logit models are estimated in three ways: ﬁrst
missing values are discussed below.
21The estimated coeﬃcients that are used for these calculations, for the other data samples, and
for other horizons are not shown for space considerations, but are available in the online appendix
at https://sites.google.com/site/paulwillenshomepage/Home/a/rtc_internet_appendix.pdf Ad-
ditional results are available by request.
22A full set of results for each outcome at the four time horizons is available in the online appendix.
16including the full sample and estimating a baseline model, next re-estimating the baseline
model with the restricted sample of loans for which there are a full set of covariates, and
ﬁnally estimating the full model with the restricted sample.23
The impact of right-censoring (experienced by a small percentage of loans which are
transferred to servicers that do not report to LPS) is also discussed more thoroughly in
the online appendix, in which we compare speciﬁcations that consider censored loans to
be persistently delinquent (and not modiﬁed) with speciﬁcations that consider the loans to
be cured, censored, or modiﬁed. Our results are robust to these other methods of treating
censored borrowers.24
3.2 Foreclosure and Cure Hazards
For several reasons, we now turn to an alternative method to analyze borrower outcomes
by looking at the monthly hazard of foreclosure and cure. At a technical level, hazards,
unlike the cumulative-incidence functions above, control for right censoring, which is a
signiﬁcant issue in the data. Almost 12 percent of loans from the CoreLogic sample that
became seriously delinquent between January 2005 and February 2009 were still delinquent
as of April 2011. The censoring issue is even more severe in the LPS sample, as about 14
percent are still delinquent at the end of the period, while an additional 6 percent have been
transferred to mortgage servicers that do not report to LPS.
The hazards also provide insights that the cumulative-incidence functions cannot. First,
the hazards allow us to overcome, to a degree, the fact that we only observe a relatively
short time series for the LPS data. Second, the evolution of the monthly hazards sheds
23Full results can be found in the online appendix. Despite the large diﬀerence in the sizes of the full
sample and subsample with complete covariates, our results are highly robust. A summary of this robustness
can be found in Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3 in the online appendix by comparing the raw outcomes across
the full and estimation samples. For clarity, we work with the estimation (that is, restricted) sample in the
rest of our analyses and robustness checks.
24These tables also attempt to distinguish how strategic defaults may inﬂuence our results. We exclude
borrowers who are most likely to have defaulted strategically—those for whom the delinquency spell we
study is their ﬁrst serious delinquency and those who miss three consecutive payments at the beginning of
their delinquency spells. While this behavior may be thought of as more common in judicial states, and thus
may make those states appear worse in terms of cures and modiﬁcations, in fact excluding these borrowers
has no eﬀect on our ﬁndings about cure rates in Table A-1 and even increases the gap between power-of-sale
and judicial states in terms of modiﬁcations. Therefore, we do not think our results in favor of power-of-sale
foreclosure are driven by strategic defaulters. We further check our results using the CoreLogic data set,
which has information on investor losses and fewer right-censored loans, allowing us to restrict our deﬁnition
of “cures” to exclude short sales. As shown in Table A-1, our results are robust in the 2005–2010 CoreLogic
sample for cure rates, although there is some evidence that the cure rates are inﬂuenced by short sales;
by removing short sales as a form of cure, judicial states appear to have somewhat higher cure rates than
power-of-sale states, about 2 to 3 percentage points at each horizon. Our results on mortgage modiﬁcations
are also similar when we use the CoreLogic data, as shown in A-3. We also examine the types and number
of modiﬁcations made to loans; full results can be found in the online appendix.
17light on competing explanations for the minimal eﬀect of judicial foreclosure procedures on
cures.
Before estimating the hazards, it is useful to note what information the cumulative-
incidence functions convey about them. Essentially, taken together a higher cumulative
foreclosure incidence and the same cumulative cure incidence imply that the instantaneous
cure hazard is higher in power-of-sale states. Intuitively, delaying the foreclosure process
gives borrowers more opportunities to cure, so if the hazard—the per-period conditional
probability of curing—were higher, then more borrowers would be expected to cure in
judicial states. However, Table 3 shows that cumulative cure rates are slightly lower in
judicial states (controlling for observable characteristics), which implies that the hazards
must also be lower.
These hazards are surprising because they show that the ostensible reasons for judicial
foreclosure—lower foreclosure rates and higher cure and modiﬁcation rates—are invalid. At
the very least, the judicial process is supposed to give borrowers more chances to cure their
delinquencies or negotiate modiﬁcations. In other words, even if cure and modiﬁcation
hazards are the same in judicial and power-of-sale states, the longer foreclosure timeline in
judicial states should translate into more of each of the two outcomes. In addition, propo-
nents suggest that the cure and modiﬁcation hazards should actually be higher in judicial
states as the increased time cost of foreclosure tilts the balance in favor of renegotiation.
But as seen in Table 3, we have found exactly the opposite.
To explain the higher cure hazards in power-of-sale states, two natural candidates
emerge. The ﬁrst is that knowledge of the process leads to some self-selection among bor-
rowers into serious delinquency. For example, in judicial states the prospect of a longer
rent-free period might induce more instances of “strategic delinquency,” borrowers who de-
cide to default despite being able to aﬀord their mortgage payments and therefore choose
ex ante not to cure. The second possibility is that the increased foreclosure hazard itself
induces some selection within the existing pool of delinquent borrowers by, for example,
removing borrowers less likely to cure.
We now turn to the actual hazards. The top and bottom panels of Figure 1 show the
unconditional monthly cure and foreclosure hazards across foreclosure regimes for the 2005–
2010 LPS sample and the 2000–2005 CoreLogic samples, respectively. As expected, Figure
1 shows both higher foreclosure and cure hazards in power-of-sale states. In both the LPS
and CoreLogic samples, cure hazards in the initial few months of delinquency are nearly
identical for borrowers in judicial and power-of-sale states, though these hazards quickly
diverge around three months, the same time that foreclosures spike in power-of-sale states.
As promised, we can use the hazards to deal with the eccentricities of our sample. Specif-
18ically, we draw attention to the fact that most borrower time-series in the LPS sample are
right-censored—we call these borrowers “persistently delinquent.” Whether those borrowers
cure or lose their homes to foreclosure has signiﬁcant policy implications: if most cure, then
in the long run a big gap will emerge in favor of judicial states because at every horizon there
are more persistently delinquent borrowers in judicial states. To address this question, we
model the hazards using a multinomial logit model which allows us to control for observable
diﬀerences in mortgage and borrower characteristics. The multinomial logit allows us to
perform a competing-risks analysis; it follows delinquent borrowers each month from the
time they become seriously delinquent to the month that they cure, lose the property to
foreclosure, or are right-censored in delinquency. Our preferred speciﬁcation incorporates
the length of the delinquency spell using indicator variables for each of the ﬁrst 24 months
and then a second-order polynomial for months 24 through 36. The odds ratios for the
variable of interest—Judicial—and other substantive covariates are displayed in Table 5.25
Using the competing-risks model, we can construct the predicted cumulative-incidence
function for a prototypical borrower over a long horizon. Figure 2 shows how the gaps
between judicial and power-of-sale states in the cumulative hazards changes as the delin-
quency spell continues for both our baseline 2005–2010 LPS sample and for the 2000–2005
CoreLogic sample. Keep in mind that, in the long run, all delinquent borrowers must ei-
ther cure or lose their homes. From the cumulative-incidence functions discussed above, we
know that at 18 months there is no diﬀerence in the number of cures but a big diﬀerence
in the number of foreclosures across the two regimes, so either the foreclosure gap between
judicial and power-of-sale states must shrink or the cure gap must explode. What Figure 2
shows is that the former is the case. In the CoreLogic sample, a 12 percentage-point gap
in foreclosure rates at month 9 shrinks to less than 4 percentage points by month 24. Even
with the short time-series in the LPS sample, we can see an even more dramatic transition
as an almost 20 percentage-point gap at month 12 falls to less than 10 percentage points by
month 36. Interestingly, when we extend the sample to include the 2010–2011 “robosign-
ing” episode, which temporarily halted foreclosure proceedings in judicial states, we see a
dramatic slowdown in convergence.
As mentioned above, the hazards also help us to understand how the foreclosure process
aﬀects cure behavior. The fact that the cure hazards are indistinguishable across regimes for
the ﬁrst three months weighs against any story of selection prior to seriously delinquency,
including the strategic delinquency example discussed above. If borrowers who default
25We achieve similar results, though with poorer ﬁt, by specifying time simply as a higher-order polyno-
mial on months. We also ﬁtted the model using a general speciﬁcation of time (with dummies for each of
the 36 months studied), but the loss of degrees of freedom was not justiﬁed by the improvements in model
ﬁt.
19in judicial states are systematically diﬀerent from borrowers who default in power-of-sale
states, it is diﬃcult to explain why diﬀerences in their behavior do not emerge until the
fourth month.
But a deeper insight comes from the fact that the spike in foreclosures in power-of-sale
states coincides with the emergence of a gap in cure rates. This fact suggests that it is the
foreclosure activity which generates selection in the existing pool of delinquent borrowers
across regimes. To illustrate this point, we propose a simple model with a continuum of
borrowers divided into two types i ∈ {g,b} for good and bad, respectively. Good types are




t is the probability of cure at time t for





t is the probability of foreclosure at time t for type i, either because the lender knows the
borrower’s type and weighs the higher likelihood of repayment resulting from forbearance
or because borrowers more likely to cure are more likely to ﬁght foreclosure through the
legal system. At time t the share of good borrowers is σt, meaning that the cure and
foreclosure hazards in the population are ct = σtc
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respectively. Thus, tracing the behavior of the hazards over time essentially amounts to
































To illustrate the eﬀect of policy on the distribution of borrower types, assume that the
survival probability 1 − fi
t − ci
t (that is, the probability of remaining in delinquency) is the
same for both types, meaning that the lower cure rate for bad types exactly oﬀsets their
higher foreclosure rates. Equation (1) shows that assuming equal survival probabilities
means that σt is constant over time. Now, assume that policymakers are able to aﬀect
the foreclosure hazards in a proportional manner, which is modeled by multiplying both
















Under the assumption of equal survival probabilities, φ = 1. Supposing that φ is increased,




























Equation (3) shows that increasing φ for one period increases the share of good borrow-
ers the next period. Reverting to the baseline φ means that σ will remain constant but
the increase in the share of good borrowers in the population persists. In other words, a
one-time proportional increase in the foreclosure probability for both types leads to a per-
manent increase in the share of good types in the borrower population. The intuition here
is straightforward: an increase in the probability of foreclosure aﬀects bad types more than
good types and improves the remaining distribution of delinquent borrowers.
Returning to Figure 1, we see that the model generates a plausible explanation for the
key stylized facts from the hazard picture. Early on in the delinquency, before foreclosures
have started, cure rates across the foreclosure regimes are very similar; in the model, this
means that the distribution of good and bad types is roughly equal. The gap in cure rates
between judicial and power-of-sale states emerges only when lenders start foreclosing and,
according to the theory, the spike in foreclosure rates in power-of-sale states permanently
changes the distribution of borrowers, leading to persistently higher instantaneous cure rates
in power-of-sale states. This provides theoretical justiﬁcation for the claim that the judicial
process indiscriminately blocks eﬃcient foreclosures.
4 The Massachusetts Right-to-cure Law
In November 2007, Massachusetts legislators passed a law that provided a 90-day right-to-
cure period for borrowers whose lenders initiated foreclosure proceedings on or after May 1,
2008.26 Right-to-cure laws temporarily stop the foreclosure clock and are aimed at helping
borrowers self-cure or obtain modiﬁcations by providing them with more time during which
to work with lenders and assemble required documentation. According to a statement by the
Massachusetts Attorney General just before the implementation of the 90-day right-to-cure
law:
We expect that lenders and servicers will use this cooling oﬀ period to engage
borrowers, ﬁnd solutions, and achieve loan modiﬁcations that make sense for
26The right-to-cure period was available for only those borrowers who occupied the properties as their
principal residences, not investors or vacation-home owners. The law also allowed the right-to-cure period
to be applied only once in a ﬁve-year period, so borrowers who cure and re-default within ﬁve years would
not receive the protection again.
21homeowners, the Commonwealth, and the lenders and investors themselves. ...
For months, we have heard the major subprime lenders and servicers talk about
loan modiﬁcations, but these words have not translated to real loan restructuring
on the scale that is necessary to staunch the tide of foreclosures.27
In this section we measure the impact of the Massachusetts right-to-cure law on the
outcomes of delinquent mortgages. There are several advantages to focusing on a spe-
ciﬁc policy, compared to our above analysis examining broad-based diﬀerences in state-
level foreclosure regulations. Perhaps the most important advantage is the ability to use
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy that compares changes in mortgage out-
comes in Massachusetts before and after the implementation of the right-to-cure law with
changes in outcomes in neighboring states that did not adopt the law. Compared to the
preceding cross-sectional analysis of mortgage outcomes in judicial and power-of-sale states,
this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy is less likely to suﬀer from simultaneity concerns.
4.1 Foreclosures and the Right to Cure in Massachusetts and
Neighboring States
We use LPS data on the performance of individual ﬁrst-lien residential mortgages originated
between 2005 and 2007 in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
We select borrowers who became 90-days delinquent in the months just before and after May
2008, when Massachusetts implemented the right-to-cure law. We restrict the sample to one-
to-four family houses and condominiums, since these are the properties covered by the law.
Table 6 displays summary statistics for various characteristics of delinquent borrowers and
mortgages at the time of loan origination, with columns for Massachusetts, the individual
comparison states, and the three comparison states pooled together. In most respects,
borrowers in the diﬀerent states are comparable on observable characteristics. Massachusetts
borrowers have slightly lower loan-to-value ratios and slightly higher credit scores than
the average non-Massachusetts borrower. In the sample, Massachusetts borrowers are also
somewhat more likely to have adjustable-rate mortgages. When comparing the earlier and
later delinquency cohorts, the later cohorts both in and out of Massachusetts appear slightly
better in these same underwriting and loan characteristics.
Foreclosure indicators show that foreclosure starts and completed foreclosures fell in
Massachusetts after the right-to-cure policy took eﬀect. Foreclosure petitions (signals of the
27Oﬃce of the Attorney General, “Governor Deval Patrick, Attorney General Martha Coakley Notify
Consumers of New Law Set to Take Eﬀect May 1st,” Press Release, April 30, 2008 (internal quotations
omitted).
22start of foreclosure proceedings) and foreclosure deeds (markers of the end of the foreclosure
process) rose rapidly in Massachusetts and neighboring states in 2007 and early 2008. In
Figure 3 the upper panel shows that foreclosure petitions in Massachusetts rose from ap-
proximately 2,000 per month in early 2007 to 3,000 per month in early 2008. Petitions de-
creased dramatically after the introduction of the 90-day right-to-cure law in Massachusetts
but returned to high levels in September 2008, which appears to show that the right-to-
cure law temporarily suspended foreclosures and may have reduced subsequent foreclosure
rates somewhat. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows that foreclosure deeds also climbed
signiﬁcantly prior to the imposition of the law and fell afterwards. What accounts for the
spike in foreclosure deeds is unclear, but it is unlikely to be related to the law, because the
petitions corresponding to the foreclosures completed before and up to three months after
the imposition of the law predate the imposition of the law and were therefore not subject
to its requirements. It is easy to see why lenders would rush to ﬁle petitions prior to the
law but there was little reason to complete foreclosures at that time.
When Massachusetts adopted the 90-day right-to-cure law, none of the surrounding
states included in the analysis (Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) had
adopted similar policies or other major changes in their foreclosure laws. Neither were
there other major policy changes inﬂuencing foreclosure rates in Massachusetts, nor other
changes in economic conditions that would have inﬂuenced Massachusetts alone. Thus, the
institution of the 90-day right-to-cure law in Massachusetts serves as a natural experiment
to assess how cure and modiﬁcation rates changed following a state-mandated delay in the
foreclosure timeline.
In Table 6 the “Outcomes” section displays the percentage of borrowers that cured
their delinquencies or received modiﬁcations of their loan terms six months after becoming
seriously delinquent. Six-month cure rates in Massachusetts fell by 3 percentage points for
loans aﬀected by the right-to-cure policy, while the same cure rates in the other states fell
by only 1 percentage point on average. On average, cure rates were 5 to 7 percentage points
lower in Massachusetts than in the other states. Modiﬁcation rates rose in Massachusetts
after the right-to-cure law was implemented, but they also rose by about the same amount
in the surrounding states. Therefore these preliminary descriptive statistics seem to suggest
that the right-to-cure law did not improve outcomes for Massachusetts borrowers in serious
default.28 We now turn to a more formal analysis to assess the impact of the Massachusetts
right-to-cure law on the outcomes of delinquent mortgages.
28Raw statistics for 3-, 12-, and 18-month cure and modiﬁcation rates show similar patterns and are
available from the authors upon request.
234.2 Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of the 90-day right-to-cure law in Massachusetts, we use the LPS data to
estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation for the probability that borrowers cure their
mortgage delinquencies or successfully renegotiate with their lenders to obtain mortgage
modiﬁcations. We track the outcomes for borrowers in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island, both before and after the law took eﬀect on May 1, 2008. In
most of the analysis, we separate borrowers into two “delinquency cohorts.” The ﬁrst cohort
is made up of borrowers who became 90-days delinquent in January, February, or March
2008, and thus were unlikely to receive the 90-day right-to-cure protection; the second cohort
is made up of borrowers who became 90-days delinquent in April, May, or June 2008, and
thus were likely to have received the right-to-cure protection.29 We estimate the eﬀect of
the right-to-cure policy using the logistic regression
Prob(yi = 1|Delinq) =
1
1 + e−(α+β·(MAi·RTCi)+δ·MAi+θ·RTCi+χ·Xi+vi), (4)
where the dependent variable, yi, is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether borrower
i has cured his or her delinquency, and MA is a dichotomous variable that indicates if
borrower i’s property is in Massachusetts. We use the date when the borrower became 90-
days delinquent as the source of exogenous variation in whether a borrower was protected
by the right-to-cure policy. Borrowers who became 90-days delinquent in April 2008 made
their last mortgage payments in December 2007. After a borrower becomes 60- to 90-days
delinquent, most lenders issue a notice of default in which they state their intention to
demand full repayment of the loan if the borrower does not immediately become current—
an action known as “accelerating” the mortgage. Assuming that an additional 30 days elapse
before the lender oﬃcially accelerates the mortgage, it is safe to assume that a borrower
who became 90-days delinquent in April 2008 would have received the 90-day right-to-cure
period, which applied to loans that had not been accelerated prior to May 1. In contrast,
borrowers who became 90-days delinquent before April 1 likely did not receive the 90-day
right-to-cure period.30 In Equation (4), RTC is a dichotomous variable indicating if the
borrower is in the cohort of borrowers who became delinquent during April–June 2008,
which would make the borrower eligible for the right-to-cure protection.
The exact time at which a loan becomes 90-days delinquent is arguably exogenous, since
29Below, we expand our analysis to consider a wider window on either side of the policy change. We
also test whether including the March defaulters in the right-to-cure cohort aﬀects the results, in case these
borrowers actually received the right-to-cure protection, but this does not change our ﬁndings.
30Information on the exact date of a given loan’s acceleration is not public record and is not included in
the data set we use. Because of this, we must use the timing of the delinquency as a proxy for whether the
borrowers received the right-to-cure or were subject to the original, expedited foreclosure process.
24within a narrow window of time (six months in this study), it is probably random as to
whether borrowers default on one side of the cut-oﬀ or the other. Presumably, ﬁnancially
distressed borrowers have little control over precisely when they stop making mortgage
payments, and even if a decision could be made about when to default, it would have been
made at least four months prior to the implementation of the right-to-cure policy. As we
will show later, there is little evidence that Massachusetts borrowers “crossed over” to the
right-to-cure delinquency cohort in order to receive the 90-day protection.
The parameter of interest in Equation (4) is β, which captures the impact of receiving the
90-day right-to-cure protection in Massachusetts. Since borrower traits and loan character-
istics also inﬂuence a delinquent borrower’s ability to cure, a vector of these characteristics,
χ, is included in the estimation. We estimate the logistic regression models separately for
cures and modiﬁcations, and examine mortgage outcomes at four intervals: 3, 6, 12, and 18
months after the borrower became 90-days delinquent. As in our analysis of judicial and
power-of-sale states, a borrower is considered to have cured his or her delinquency if the
mortgage is recorded as current at any time during the interval, even if the borrower later
redefaults on the mortgage. We hypothesize that diﬀerences in outcomes between borrowers
who receive and do not receive the right-to-cure protection, if such diﬀerences exist, will be
strongest for the 3- and 6-month periods. Because the policy only directly impacts the ﬁrst
90 days after a borrower receives a notice of default, it seems reasonable to expect that any
eﬀects of the policy would be attenuated over time.
We identify the treatment eﬀect of the 90-day right-to-cure policy on delinquent Mas-
sachusetts borrowers with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression speciﬁed in Equation (4).
The process essentially occurs by comparing two diﬀerences. The ﬁrst diﬀerence reﬂects
the change in Massachusetts borrower cure rates from before and after the right to cure
took eﬀect. The second diﬀerence identiﬁes the change in cure rates during the same period
in the neighboring states. Subtracting the second diﬀerence from the ﬁrst yields the ﬁnal
diﬀerence—the so-called diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences—which is an estimate of the causal impact
of the right to cure, net of any general trends in cure rates that may have occurred during
the time period. We repeat the same procedure to measure the law’s eﬀect on modiﬁcations.
The appropriateness of this strategy rests on two key assumptions. The ﬁrst is that
borrower outcomes in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island serve as adequate
comparison groups for assessing general trends in cures and modiﬁcations. While there are
small diﬀerences in borrower and mortgage attributes across states, as seen in Table 6 and
discussed brieﬂy above, the states contain broadly similar characteristics. In addition, there
were no changes to foreclosure laws in the three comparison states during the study period,
so it seems that these states indeed serve as a useful and appropriate comparison group.
25The second assumption is that trends in cure and modiﬁcation probabilities over time must
be linear within the borrower cohorts. Inspection of the raw cure and modiﬁcation rates by
borrower cohort, located at the bottom of Table 6, suggests that borrowers in each cohort
had similar outcomes in Massachusetts and in the comparison group.
4.3 Results
In this section we report the results from estimating Equation (4) for cure and modiﬁcation,
our two mortgage outcomes of interest. Results are reported using short horizons of 3 and
6 months after entering serious delinquency, as well as for longer time horizons of 12 and 18
months. An important point to note before presenting the results is that, as with the LPS
data we used in the analysis of judicial and power-of-sale states, there is a right-censoring
issue in the data: approximately 4 percent of seriously delinquent mortgages are censored
by the 18th month, either because they were transferred to diﬀerent servicers that do not
report to LPS or, more rarely, because the existing servicers stopped reporting information
on the loans. In the estimation results reported in this section, these censored loans are
assumed not to have cured or experienced a modiﬁcation. As a robustness check, we have
estimated all the models in this section in two ways, ﬁrst by considering all the censored
loans as having cured and received a modiﬁcation, then by considering all the censored loans
not to have cured or received a modiﬁcation. This provides upper and lower bounds for the
cure and modiﬁcation rates.31
A second challenge presented by the LPS data set is missing values for covariates. About
half the loans lack at least one piece of information on borrower characteristics, mortgage
terms, or ZIP code–level change in the house price index since origination. Rather than
impute the missing values, we addressed the missing data problem by estimating the logit
models in three ways: ﬁrst with no additional control variables on the full sample of loans
that include mortgages with missing information on covariates (the “full sample”); next with
no additional control variables on the sample of loans without missing values on covariates
(the “restricted sample”); and ﬁnally with additional control variables on the restricted
sample. Interestingly, the sign and size of the coeﬃcients of interest (those on the state
dummies, cohort dummy, and Massachusetts cohort interaction) are not sensitive to the
type of speciﬁcation used or the sample restriction to only those loans with full covariate
31The lower bound is probably the more accurate number, at least for the cure estimates. Among the
censored loans, nearly two-thirds were in foreclosure at their last observation and almost all the remaining
one-third were 90-days delinquent but pre-foreclosure. Thus, we chose to assume that censored loans do
not cure and are not modiﬁed for the results presented in the paper. The two methods, however, generate
very similar results; our results hold regardless of how we treat the censored borrowers. When we estimate
a hazard model for loan outcomes, we also ﬁnd similar results.
26information. This suggests that observations with missing covariates are not systematically
diﬀerent than observations with full information. Table 7 displays the estimation results for
these three samples at the 6-month horizon for both the cure and modiﬁcation outcomes,
respectively. The key odds ratio of interest—the interaction between the Massachusetts
indicator and the indicator for the implementation of the right-to-cure law (MA×RTC)—
is less than one but never more than marginally signiﬁcant in any of the samples for the
cure or modiﬁcation outcome. Thus, the 90-day right-to-cure law does not appear to have
had a positive impact on mortgage outcomes for delinquent Massachusetts borrowers at
the 6-month horizon. It is notable that, across the region, cures and modiﬁcations became
more common for borrowers who became seriously delinquent in the second quarter of
2008.32 This ﬁnding is consistent with previous evidence of increased modiﬁcation rates
over the course of the mortgage crisis (see, for example, Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009).
However, it is clear from the results that there was no relative increase in modiﬁcation rates
in Massachusetts compared to neighboring states.
The ﬁtted probabilities of cure and modiﬁcation are shown in Figure 4 for a prototypical
borrower of a ﬁxed-rate purchase mortgage with average LTV (79 percent), FICO score
(651), months elapsed between origination and default (18), average decline in ZIP code–
level price index since origination (8.9 percent), and average increase in unemployment rate
(0.54 percentage points). As shown in Figure 4, the ﬁtted probability of cure for borrowers
in Massachusetts three months after becoming seriously delinquent held steady at about
0.16 after the right-to-cure period was introduced, while in Connecticut the probability of
cure rose from 0.18 to 0.21.33
Figure 4 further conﬁrms that there has been no economically meaningful change in
modiﬁcation rates in Massachusetts following the implementation of the right-to-cure law.
While modiﬁcation rates were higher in Massachusetts for borrowers who received the right
to cure (dashed blue line), the positive diﬀerence in modiﬁcations was even greater for the
comparison cohort of Connecticut borrowers (dashed red line). As with the cure models,
greater statistical power is unlikely to change the results because the critical cumulative
odds ratio (MA×RTC) is less than one for two of the time horizons and approximately
one for the most meaningful time horizon, the ﬁnal period (18 months after the mortgages
became seriously delinquent).
32See the right-to-cure odds ratios in Table 7 and the distance between the solid and dotted lines in
Figure 4.
33For ease of interpretation, Figure 4 displays only the ﬁtted probabilities for borrowers in Massachusetts
and Connecticut. Results for Rhode Island and New Hampshire are available upon request.
274.4 Robustness Checks
To be conﬁdent that the right-to-cure law improved neither the rates at which Massachusetts
borrowers cured nor the rates at which they received modiﬁcations, we examined the sensi-
tivity of the results to alternative model speciﬁcations and sample deﬁnitions. In addition,
we examined descriptive statistics to determine if there is evidence that borrowers could
“self-select” into the delinquency cohort that received the right-to-cure protection. Be-
low we present the results from diﬀerent speciﬁcations—allowing borrowers with previous
delinquencies, adjusting the sizes and deﬁnitions of the delinquency cohorts, re-deﬁning
the modiﬁcation outcome to examine whether diﬀerent types of modiﬁcations were made,
and examining the potential bias of borrower “self-selection.” Finally, we discuss the steps
taken to address the largest threat to validity, the diﬃculty of deﬁnitively categorizing Mas-
sachusetts borrowers as having received or not received the 90-day right-to-cure period.34
Recall that the baseline sample includes borrowers who became seriously delinquent for
the ﬁrst time during January–June 2008. Some borrowers impacted by the implementa-
tion of the right-to-cure law may have experienced delinquency previously. Including these
borrowers in our sample does not change our results. In order to isolate the impact of the
right-to-cure law and avoid complications from borrowers who bounced in and out of delin-
quency before January 2008, we must still remove any borrowers who had been seriously
delinquent in the year leading up to their January–June 2008 delinquency spells. In other
words, for this exercise, borrowers who became seriously delinquent in April 2008 could not
have been 90 or more days delinquent since April 2007. Notice that this still allows borrow-
ers to be in the sample if they were seriously delinquent in prior years. While this particular
group of borrowers (those who were seriously delinquent in the year before January–June
2008) makes up a small portion of the sample and appears equally spread across the states
and delinquency cohorts (see “previous 90-day delinquency spell” in Table 6), we decided
to exclude them from the models to be sure that they do not drive the results. In the
online appendix we display additional results for this restricted sample, although none of
the estimates of interest change in any substantive way.
To further test the validity of the results, we adjusted the sizes of the cohorts from
three months each to ﬁve months each. In other words, the early cohort was extended to
include borrowers who became seriously delinquent November 2007–March 2008 and the
later cohort was extended to include borrowers who became seriously delinquent April–
August 2008. This change increased the sample of borrowers who became delinquent for
the ﬁrst time and which contained complete data on all covariates by about 3,500 mortgages.
Increasing the size of the cohorts allows us to test the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to borrowers
34To conserve space, we have placed the tables of these robustness checks in the online appendix.
28who became seriously delinquent four to ﬁve months before and after the cutoﬀ, which is
appealing because the treatment status of these borrowers (whether or not they received the
right-to-cure protection) is more certain compared to the borrowers who became seriously
delinquent very close to the policy change.35 Our substantive ﬁndings do not change when
we estimate the logit model on the larger cohorts.
Although we have found no evidence of a signiﬁcant diﬀerential change in modiﬁca-
tion rates in Massachusetts following the introduction of the 90-day right-to-cure period,
it could be possible that the types of modiﬁcations changed—that is, the distribution of
modiﬁcations could have shifted to types that are more beneﬁcial for borrowers. In order to
investigate this possibility, we estimated separate logit models for each type of modiﬁcation:
interest-rate adjustment, monthly-payment reduction, term extension, principal-balance re-
duction, and principal-balance increase. The estimation results showed no evidence that
any speciﬁc type of modiﬁcation rate changed after the introduction of the right to cure,
conditional on controlling for regional changes in modiﬁcation rates. Finally, we ﬁtted a
Poisson model to estimate the number of mortgage modiﬁcations that a given loan received,
but there was still no evidence of a policy eﬀect in Massachusetts.
Another concern is that ﬁnancially distressed borrowers in Massachusetts who had no
intention of curing their mortgage defaults or seeking modiﬁcations may have strategically
placed themselves in the cohort that received the right-to-cure protection. Such strate-
gic behavior would attenuate the eﬀect of the right-to-cure policy on mortgage cures and
modiﬁcations. Homeowners were given signiﬁcant advance notice that the right-to-cure law
would take eﬀect, because Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed the legislation that
created it in November 2007. While some forward-looking borrowers may have had the
incentive to postpone their defaults in order to slow the foreclosure process and increase
the time they could live in their properties rent-free, such a strategy would have required
signiﬁcant advanced planning. Note that a borrower who became 90-days delinquent in
April 2008 made his or her last mortgage payment in December 2007. Not only would a
borrower have had to meticulously plan the timing of default (and have detailed knowledge
of the workings of the foreclosure process), but he or she would have had to possess the
ﬁnancial resources to postpone default. After all, any gain in the time the borrower could
live in the home rent-free (perhaps 30 or 60 days) would be partially oﬀset by having to
make the additional mortgage payment(s) to postpone default until the right-to-cure law
went into eﬀect. Therefore, it seems unlikely that many borrowers would have purposely
“crossed over” into the protected cohort. The number of borrowers in the Massachusetts
35Of course, the tradeoﬀ is that borrowers who became seriously delinquent in November 2007 may be
diﬀerent in unobserved ways from borrowers who became seriously delinquent in June 2008.
29cohort increases somewhat after the introduction of the right to cure, though the same can
be said of each of the three other states. Given that the number and characteristics of
borrowers in the two Massachusetts cohorts appear very similar, it seems unlikely that the
results in this section are driven by self-selection into the protected cohort of borrowers who
are unlikely to cure.
One might expect that lenders could also have acted strategically when faced with the
policy change in Massachusetts, though it is unlikely that such a scenario drives our results.
In theory, lenders had an incentive to speed up foreclosures in the early spring of 2008 so that
mortgages would be accelerated before May 1 and not receive the right-to-cure protection.
There are two reasons why this possibility is unlikely to bias the results. First, most loans are
originated using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac uniform mortgage documents, which require
that lenders wait at least 30 days between issuing the notice of default and accelerating the
mortgage. So most lenders were contractually bound to the slower timeline and could not
quickly accelerate mortgages. Second, although lenders would be legally allowed to send
the notice of default sooner—after the borrower becomes 60-days delinquent rather than
90-days delinquent, for example—they would be unlikely to do so. Initiating foreclosure
proceedings is costly for the lender and, since many borrowers cure their mortgage defaults
before becoming seriously delinquent, this would amount to wasted eﬀort on the lender’s
part. If lenders can determine which borrowers were least likely to cure and speed up the
foreclosure process for those borrowers by sending the notice of default earlier, this would
actually result in upwardly biased eﬀects of the right-to-cure policy on borrower cures, since
borrowers least likely to cure would be contaminating the control group. In summary, it
seems unlikely that strategic behavior by borrowers or lenders is driving the absence of
improvements in borrower cures following the implementation of the right-to-cure policy.
Perhaps the most important drawback to the analysis is the fact that we do not possess
information on the exact date that the mortgages were accelerated and thus we cannot
deﬁnitively categorize borrowers in Massachusetts as having received or not received the 90-
day right-to-cure period. As previously discussed, the standard timeline for issuing default
notices, coupled with the required 30-day waiting period for accelerations that was built into
standardized mortgage documents, gives us conﬁdence that borrowers who became seriously
delinquent after March 2008 received the right-to-cure protection. However, if lenders were
slower to begin foreclosure proceedings, borrowers who became delinquent earlier in 2008
may also have received the protection. If this is the case, the borrowers who became seriously
delinquent in March 2008 would be the most likely to be miscategorized. To check for this,
we adjusted the original 3-month cohorts to categorize borrowers who became seriously
delinquent in March 2008 as having received the right-to-cure protection. The results do
30not change substantively; cure probabilities for the 3-month horizon decreased slightly in
Massachusetts relative to the comparison states, which is exactly what we found using the
original cohort deﬁnitions.
4.5 Discussion
The results of this analysis, which are highly robust to alternative speciﬁcations and sample
restrictions, suggest that the right-to-cure policy that Massachusetts implemented in 2008
had no impact on borrowers’ ability to cure their mortgage defaults or obtain mortgage
modiﬁcations. In fact, in some speciﬁcations, there is a small and marginally signiﬁcant
decline in cure probabilities at the earliest stage examined, three months after the borrower
became seriously delinquent.
One potential explanation for our results that the law did not improve borrower outcomes
is that the right-to-cure period was so short that it made little diﬀerence to borrowers in
terms of postponing foreclosure while they sought new employment, found a buyer for the
property, or worked with lenders to secure modiﬁcations. This idea seems to be the current
assumption of Massachusetts policymakers, who in August 2010 extended the right-to-cure
period to 150 days. Once adequate time has passed, it will be important to evaluate how
borrower outcomes have been shaped by this extension.36
As for the small and marginally signiﬁcant decline in early cure rates, some borrowers
in Massachusetts may have simply taken advantage of the right-to-cure period to linger in
default and put oﬀ curing, knowing that foreclosure was not imminent. Meanwhile, an addi-
tional 90 days may have made little diﬀerence for borrowers actively seeking modiﬁcations.
Lenders, which face higher costs as a result of the longer foreclosure processes, could have
even less incentive to modify loans after the right-to-cure period was introduced. Given that
a very large proportion of borrowers who receive modiﬁcation re-default on their mortgages,
lenders may be hesitant to oﬀer modiﬁcations to borrowers who receive longer foreclosure
protections; if these borrowers re-default, it will take much longer to foreclose and will cost
the lender even more.
36We have examined the 3- and 6-month cure and modiﬁcation rates of borrowers who became seriously
delinquent in the months leading up to and following the August 2010 extension of the law. The results,
shown in the appendix in Table A-13, seem to indicate that the extended right to cure has been no more
successful at improving borrower outcomes than the original. However, these data only account for borrower
outcomes through March 2011; the policy should be fully evaluated after more time has elapsed.
315 Policy Implications
Do judicial intervention and the interposition of a right-to-cure period in the foreclosure
process produce better outcomes? The answer to this question depends on how one deﬁnes
outcomes. To analyze this, we ﬁrst focus on the narrow goals of the laws—prevention of
unjust or unnecessary foreclosures—and then consider the broader eﬀect on the housing
market and aﬀected communities.
On their narrow goals, one has to conclude that both judicial foreclosure and right-to-
cure statutes are policy failures. We have shown that neither approach has any eﬀect on the
number of borrowers who cure their delinquencies. If the laws allowed borrowers to escape
from unjust or unnecessary foreclosures, we would see more cures and more modiﬁcations,
neither of which occurs. Of course, a ﬁnding that borrowers were more likely to cure would
not necessarily imply that either law was eﬀective policy, because both laws exact high costs
in terms of delayed foreclosures; the lack of any appreciable beneﬁt saves us the trouble of
conducting such a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
In a sense, the failure of judicial foreclosure to aﬀect outcomes is not so surprising. Legal
scholars have long argued that the power-of-sale procedure can replicate the protections of
the judicial process at much lower cost. Nelson and Whitman (1985, 536), for example,
write that
The underlying theory of power of sale foreclosure is simple. It is that by com-
plying with the above type statutory requirements the [lender] accomplishes the
same purposes achieved by judicial foreclosure without the substantial additional
burdens that the latter type of foreclosure entails. Those purposes are to ter-
minate all interests junior to the mortgage being foreclosed and to provide the
sale purchaser with a title identical to that of the mortgagor as of the time the
mortgage being foreclosed was executed.
It is important to understand that, despite the absence of direct supervision by the courts,
the lender in a power-of-sale foreclosure has a strong incentive to follow the rules of law
because any failure to do so clouds the title and reduces the value of the property. U.S.
Bank v. Iba˜ nez supra, illustrates this point: a title insurer raised questions about whether
the lender had followed proper procedures, which led the lender to go to land court to get
a judicial stamp of approval. Some even argue that, in some cases, the fact that the courts
have rendered a ﬁnal judgment when a judicial foreclosure occurs precludes the borrower
from raising issues that he or she might be able to after a power-of-sale foreclosure.
Our results show that lenders already do exactly what the lawmakers want them to do. In
Section 3.2, we argued that the hazard rates implied that lenders foreclose more intensively
32on the borrowers least likely to cure. In other words, borrowers who stand to beneﬁt the
most from additional time already get it. In Section 4, we showed that implementing a
90-day right-to-cure period had a big eﬀect on the timing of foreclosure petitions but not
on the timing of foreclosure sales, meaning, eﬀectively, that borrowers already got a 90-day
period to cure default.
But the laws obviously have broader eﬀects and judging those eﬀects is a far more
nuanced task. At the crudest level, delaying the foreclosure process causes a wealth transfer
from lender to borrower. The borrower lives rent-free while the lender loses interest income
from the capital in the property and cannot get reimbursed for the depreciation. But there
are other potential eﬀects for the community as a whole.
Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2011) have argued that foreclosures depress house prices so
therefore the judicial foreclosure process, which slows the pace of foreclosures, beneﬁts the
economy. Our results show that one must interpret any such claim with great caution. We
have shown that the judicial procedure alters the timing but not the number of foreclosures.
Thus, any test of the eﬀect of diﬀerent legal regimes on house prices is a joint test of the
hypothesis that foreclosures drive down prices and that market participants are myopic and
do not realize that there is a glut of foreclosed properties looming in judicial states. In fact,
market commentators are equally as likely to attribute the weakness in the housing market
to foreclosures as they are to “foreclosure overhang,” the mass of what we call “persistently
delinquent” borrowers for whom foreclosure is more or less inevitable.
Taking Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi’s argument at face value, one might think that legal
protections indirectly prevent foreclosures by slowing price declines and thus preventing
delinquencies—that is, even if the laws do not prevent delinquencies from turning into
foreclosures, they might prevent delinquencies from occurring in the ﬁrst place. However,
Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2011, 3) argue against this hypothesis, ﬁnding that “the rate at
which homeowners default on their homes is almost identical in states that do and do not
require judicial foreclosure. But the rate at which delinquencies progress into foreclosures
is substantially lower in judicial requirement states.”
The unambiguous eﬀect of delaying foreclosure is that it lengthens the period for sep-
aration of ownership and control of residential property. As prominent housing economist
Edward Glaeser writes:
Delinquent homeowners want to inhabit and to control their homes. Lenders
want to get them out and to limit the damage done to the property. During
the foreclosure process, home occupants have no reason to invest in their homes.
Indeed, spite sometimes pushes them to abuse the property. [This] logic suggests
that such periods ensure an abuse of the housing stock, which is one reason why
33homes often lose close to half of their value when they go through foreclosure.37
Indeed, of the 200 properties New York City cited in 2008 as the worst maintained, 77 were
in the foreclosure process.38 Policies designed to protect borrowers from foreclosure may
have the unintended consequence of aggravating the externalities—crime, vandalism, and
inhumane living conditions for tenants among them—associated with failed home owner-
ships.
37Edward Glaeser, “Foreclosing the Crisis,” The New Republic, February 4, 2009.
38Manny Fernandez and Jennifer Lee, “Struggling Landlords Leaving Repairs Undone,” New York Times,
July 14, 2009.
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Note: See Table 5 for estimates of hazard model for LPS sample.Figure 3: Foreclosure Petitions and Deeds
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Source: The Warren Group and authors’ calculations.
Note: Figure indicates deeds ﬁled each month in Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and Rhode Island between January 2007 and June 2009. Petition data are not
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Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Cure and modiﬁcation probabilities are based on the right-to-cure results
for an average ﬁxed-rate mortgage borrower in Massachusetts or Connecticut at
3, 6, 12, and 18 months after becoming 90-days delinquent.Table 1: Summary Statistics
LPS 2005–2010 CoreLogic 2005–2010 CoreLogic 2000–2005
Power of Sale Judicial Total Power of Sale Judicial Total Power of Sale Judicial Total
Average Characteristics at Origination
Origination Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2001 2001 2001
Loan-to-value Ratio (%) 81 82 82 81 82 81 79 79 79
FICO Score (range: 460–816) 654 648 652 643 631 638 582 581 582
Loan Purpose (%)
Purchase 51 54 52 49 49 49 33 33 33
Reﬁnance 49 46 48 51 51 51 67 67 67
Type of Mortgage Interest (%)
Fixed Rate 50 59 53 16 21 18 33 36 34
Adjustable Rate 50 41 47 84 79 82 67 64 66
Occupancy Status (%)
Primary Residence 92 88 90 89 84 87 91 89 90
Second Home or Investment Property 8 12 10 11 16 13 9 11 10
Property Type (%)
Single Family 87 78 84 87 77 83 94 88 91
Small Multi-Family (2–4 Units) 2 5 3 5 11 7 3 9 6
Condominium 11 17 13 8 12 10 3 3 3
Pre-delinquency Status
Months Elapsed 19 18 19 19 18 19 16 17 16
Percent Change in House Price Index −13 −9 −11 −11 −6 −10 10 13 11
Change in Unemployment Rate 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8
Outcomes (%)
Cured by 6 Months 21 21 21 20 21 21 33 30 32
Modiﬁed by 6 Months 10 9 10 10 10 10 n/a n/a n/a
Observations 101,740 58,751 160,491 85,167 47,069 132,236 10,482 7,142 17,624
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS), CoreLogic, and authors’ calculations.
Note: “Months Elapsed” measures the number of months between the month of the ﬁrst payment and the month the mortgage became 90-days delinquent. “Change in
House Price Index” measures the percent change in the CoreLogic ZIP code–level house price index between origination and the month of the ﬁrst missed payment in the
delinquency spell. “Change in Unemployment Rate” captures the change in the county-level unemployment rate between origination and delinquency.Table 2: Foreclosure Timelines
Power of Sale
State Half-life % Completed


































Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Sample includes all loans on which we observe a foreclosure or do not observe a cure
at the time of right-censoring. Probability of foreclosure is computed using unadjusted
monthly hazards of foreclosure.
Judicial
State Half-life % Completed


















WI 25 52Table 3: Cumulative Incidence of Various Outcomes of Serious Delinquency
3 Months 6 Months
(1) (2) (1)−(2) (3) (4) (3)−(4)
Power Judicial Raw With Power Judicial Raw With
of Sale Controls of Sale Controls
Cured 11.8 12.2 −0.4 1.2 18.8 19.1 −0.3 2.1
Modiﬁed 5.7 4.9 0.8 0.6 10.3 8.8 1.5 1.4
Persistently Delinquent 84.3 87.1 −2.8 −4.4 61.9 78.3 −16.4 −15.6
No foreclosure action 40.6 39.0 1.7 25.4 22.8 2.6
Foreclosure proceedings started 43.7 48.2 −4.5 36.5 55.5 −19.0
Foreclosed 3.8 0.6 3.2 2.7 19.3 2.6 16.7 12.1
REO 3.3 0.5 2.8 16.8 1.9 14.9
Liquidated 0.5 0.2 0.4 2.5 0.6 1.8
12 Months 18 Months
(1) (2) (1)−(2) (3) (4) (3)−(4)
Power Judicial Raw With Power Judicial Raw With
of Sale controls of Sale controls
Cured 25.6 26.0 −0.4 3.0 29.7 29.9 −0.2 3.6
Modiﬁed 15.7 13.7 2.0 2.2 19.4 17.5 1.9 2.4
Persistently Delinquent 39.0 60.5 −21.5 −22.8 27.8 47.4 −19.6 −23.0
No foreclosure action 13.6 11.1 2.5 8.7 6.9 1.9
Foreclosure proceedings started 25.4 49.4 −24.0 19.0 40.5 −21.5
Foreclosed 35.4 13.5 21.9 17.6 42.6 22.8 19.8 17.0
REO 22.1 10.0 12.1 17.6 13.6 4.1
Liquidated 13.3 3.5 9.8 25.0 9.2 15.8
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS) and authors’ calculations.
Note: Sample includes borrowers who became delinquent from 2005 to 2009 observed through April 2011. Outcomes are deﬁned
in Section 3. Columns labeled “With controls” show the diﬀerence calculated using estimated parameters from the logit model
described in Section 3 with parameter estimates in Table 4.Table 4: State Statute Results
Cure Foreclosure Modiﬁcation
Judicial 0.861∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(8.66) (63.13) (7.55)
Reﬁnance 1.162∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗
(8.64) (13.74) (10.30)
Adjustable-rate Mortgage 0.650∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(25.95) (39.96) (3.78)
FICO at Origination 0.995∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
(40.13) (37.19) (40.78)
Months Since First Payment 1.013∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗
(14.67) (24.21) (21.52)
LTV Ratio at Origination 0.982∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 1.002∗
(25.04) (19.60) (2.25)
Owner Occupant 1.511∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗
(12.75) (21.05) (13.72)
Condominium 0.848∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(6.95) (3.73) (6.95)
Multi-family (2–4 units) 0.774∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗ 0.929
(5.14) (2.61) (1.16)
Percent Change in House Price Index 1.032∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 1.002∗
(39.09) (13.82) (2.24)
Change in Unemployment Rate 1.008 0.831∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗
(1.33) (29.33) (7.38)
Observations 89,680 89,680 89,113
Chi-square 7,547.54 11,834.14 3,137.96
Log Likelihood −47,282.63 −47,148.67 −35,098.58
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS), CoreLogic, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Cumulative cure, foreclosure, and modiﬁcation results at 12 months. Displayed statistics
are odds ratios with z-statistics in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at






Adjustable-rate Mortgage 0.722∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗
(25.20) (24.31)
FICO at Origination 0.996∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗
(37.02) (40.45)
Months Since First Payment 1.009∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(12.19) (15.99)
LTV Ratio at Origination 0.988∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
(22.94) (14.20)




Multi-family (2–4 units) 0.788∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗
(6.23) (3.94)
Percent Change in House Price Index 1.021∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(33.29) (8.94)
Change in Unemployment Rate 0.972∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗
(4.94) (13.26)
Observations (mortgages by month) 1,239,176
Chi-square 44,498.66
Log Likelihood −294,344.73
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS), CoreLogic, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Includes borrowers who became 90-days delinquent between January 2005
and February 2009. Displayed statistics are hazard ratios with z-statistics in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and ∼ represent statistical signiﬁcance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. The model also includes a quadratic term for months
elapsed since the mortgage became seriously delinquent, a set of dummy vari-
ables for the ﬁrst 24 months after becoming seriously delinquent, interactions
between the month dummies and Judicial, cohort dummies for the year the mort-
gage became seriously delinquent, and interactions between cohort dummies and
Judicial.Table 6: Right-to-cure Results—Descriptive Statistics for Delinquency Cohorts
Month Loan Became 90-days Delinquent
January–March 2008 April–June 2008
MA (RI, CT, NH) RI CT NH MA (RI, CT, NH) RI CT NH
Average Characteristics at Origination
Origination Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006
Loan-to-value Ratio (%) 79 80 80 80 79 78 80 79 80 79
FICO Score (range: 460–816) 653 640 651 636 640 660 647 655 644 646
Loan Purpose (%)
Purchase 36 40 37 44 34 36 38 38 39 35
Reﬁnance 64 60 63 56 66 64 62 62 61 65
Type of Mortgage Interest (%)
Fixed Rate 56 62 60 61 66 60 63 63 60 71
Adjustable Rate 44 38 40 39 34 40 37 37 40 29
Occupancy Status (%)
Primary Residence 93 93 92 93 92 92 92 92 92 90
Second Home or Investment Property 7 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 10
Property Type (%)
Single Family 66 76 73 75 82 66 75 66 76 80
Small Multi-Family (2–4 Units) 15 13 20 12 7 15 14 24 13 7
Condominium 19 11 7 13 11 19 11 10 11 13
Pre-delinquency Status
Months Elapsed 18 18 17 17 19 19 20 19 20 21
Previous 90-day Delinquency Spell 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
Percent Change in House Price Index −10 −6 −13 −4 −5 −10 −7 −11 −4 −6
Change in Unemployment Rate 0.38 1.02 2.03 0.84 0.41 0.14 0.86 2.09 0.63 0.07
Outcomes (%)
Cured by 6 Months 23 28 20 29 31 20 27 23 26 32
Modiﬁed by 6 Months 9 11 9 12 13 10 12 11 12 13
Observations 2,958 2,692 622 1,446 624 3,296 2,822 682 1,502 638
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS), CoreLogic, and authors’ calculations.
Note: “Months Elapsed” measures the number of months between the month of the ﬁrst payment and the month the mortgage became 90-days delinquent.
“Change in House Price Index” measures the percent change in the CoreLogic ZIP code–level house price index between origination and the month of the ﬁrst
missed payment in the delinquency spell. “Change in Unemployment Rate” captures the change in the county-level unemployment rate between origination
and delinquency.Table 7: Right-to-cure Results—Comparison of Cure and Modiﬁcation Rates
Cure Modiﬁcation
Full Sample Restricted Full Sample Restricted
Sample Sample
Right-to-cure 1.122 1.223∼ 1.207 1.428∗∗ 1.466∗ 1.425∼
(1.58) (1.77) (1.63) (2.81) (1.98) (1.8)
Massachusetts 0.847∗ 0.748∗ 0.908 0.97 0.777 0.985
(2.01) (2.35) (0.71) (0.21) (1.18) (0.06)
Massachusetts x Right-to-cure 0.826∼ 0.852 0.843 0.808 0.905 0.948
(1.83) (1.00) (1.05) (1.21) (0.37) (0.20)
Rhode Island 0.753∗∗ 0.683∗∗ 0.724∼ 0.651∗ 0.625∗ 0.768
(2.95) (2.81) (1.85) (2.47) (2.02) (0.89)
New Hampshire 1.246∗ 0.957 0.946 1.17 0.523 0.594
(2.54) (0.23) (0.28) (1.08) (1.62) (1.27)
Reﬁnance 0.995 0.933
(0.05) (0.48)
Adjustable-rate Mortgage 0.579∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗
(5.98) (3.52)
FICO at Origination 0.996∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
(5.33) (5.98)
Months Since First Payment 1.026∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(5.3) (4.84)
LTV Ratio at Origination 0.988∗∗∗ 1.002
(3.84) (0.69)




Multi-family (2-4 units) 0.691∗∗ 0.773
(2.79) (1.19)
Percent Change in House Price Index 1.01 1.012
(1.43) (1.04)
Change in Unemployment Rate 1.08 1.035
(1.19) (0.33)
Observations 11,522 5,327 5,327 11,423 5,282 5,282
Chi-square 49.67 23.09 162.31 20.68 13.52 104.26
Log Likelihood −4,857.22 −2,111.33 −2,041.72 −2,197.59 −972.69 −927.32
Source: Lender Processing Services (LPS), CoreLogic, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Comparison of cure and modiﬁcation rates reﬂects 6 months after entrance into serious delinquency for baseline and ﬁnal models;
excludes borrowers who were 90-days delinquent before January 2008. Sample size diﬀers for modiﬁcation and cure models because modiﬁ-
cation sample excludes some loans that experienced suspicious term changes and were thus left out of the estimation. Displayed statistics are
odds ratios with z-statistics in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, and ∼ represent statistical signiﬁcance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.